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How Russia has used force against Ukraine since early 2014 has prompted some 
observers to remark that it is engaging in ‘hybrid warfare’. Rather than openly using 
military power to secure its political objectives in Ukraine, Russia has adopted a subtler 
approach intended to give the Kremlin ‘plausible deniability’ while reducing the costs 
associated with engaging Ukraine’s armed forces directly. To illustrate, Russia did not 
launch a traditional invasion to wrest Crimea away from Kiev’s control. Instead, it 
fomented local pro-Russian demonstrations; inserted unmarked militia groups (‘little 
green men’) to occupy official government buildings; and oversaw a local referendum to 
lend an air of legitimacy to the annexation effort. In eastern Ukraine, Moscow continues 
to deny that it is directly involved in armed hostilities between Kiev and rebel groups. 
Nevertheless, it provides those rebels with diplomatic cover as well as heavy munitions 
and logistical support. Despite the Kremlin’s assertions to the contrary, strong evidence 
indicates that some Russian units are fighting Ukrainian forces in the Donbas region.
1
 
Russia’s military statecraft has also raised concerns regarding the security of 
Russia’s other neighbors, especially the Baltic countries. Amplifying these concerns is 
the June 2015 announcement that Russia is reconsidering the legitimacy of the 
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independence they had won in 1990–1991.2 Individually and collectively, Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania suffer from an unfavorable balance of power with Russia. Their armies 
feature about 2800, 1250, and 7350 soldiers respectively. By contrast, the Russian 
Ground Forces has 250,000 soldiers, to say nothing of Russia’s aerial, maritime, and 
nuclear capabilities.
3
 Yet the Baltic countries are members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and so enjoy an Article Five commitment from the United States 
and other allies. This provision of the alliance’s founding treaty affirms that an attack 
against one member constitutes an attack against all. Accordingly, the Baltic countries 
enjoy the military protection of a conventionally superior and nuclear-armed NATO, 
thereby offsetting the disparities they have with Russia. Still, they see themselves as 
vulnerable. They fear that, with hybrid warfare, Russia would use subversion rather than 
pursue a conventional military engagement against them. It remains unclear what an 
alliance like NATO could do to deter (and defend against) such forms of aggression 
against them. 
Despite these concerns, existing descriptions of hybrid warfare suffer from 
important conceptual weaknesses. The purpose of this essay is to describe the logic of 
hybrid warfare and explain why former Soviet republics like the Baltic countries might 
be vulnerable to it. This essay first defines hybrid warfare, conceiving it as a marriage of 
conventional deterrence and insurgent tactics. Rather than being a new form of warfare, 
hybrid warfare is a strategy that the belligerent uses to advance its political goals on the 
battlefield by applying military force subversively. The essay then describes why former 
Soviet republics are vulnerable to Russian hybrid warfare. Upon doing so, it inductively 
proposes four conditions that jointly make hybrid warfare more likely: first, the 
belligerent has local escalation dominance; second, the belligerent seeks to revise the 
status quo; third, the belligerent has a relatively weak neighboring state insofar as it lacks 
a robust civil society and has local ethnic or linguistic cleavages that can be exploited; 
and fourth, the weak neighbor has some ethnic or linguistic ties to the belligerent.  
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By describing why Russia has resorted to hybrid warfare within the former Soviet 
Union, and where other belligerents might do the same elsewhere, this paper shows that 
military solutions are incomplete. After all, hybrid warfare exploits nationalist identities, 
thereby obfuscating responsibility and even gaining political support among foreign 
audiences. Hybrid warfare incorporates the most potent attributes of an insurgency while 
minimizing the drawbacks associated with using conventional force. It is not a strategy 
borne out of weakness but out of strength. Thus, in the Baltic context, Russia’s strategy 
aims to weaken NATO willingness to follow through on its own deterrent threats. 
Military solutions overlook this dimension of Russian hybrid warfare because they focus 
disproportionately on modifying or restructuring military capabilities. These capabilities 
can deter some forms of aggression, but they may be insufficient for preventing Russia 
from sowing local discord. Political solutions that lie beyond NATO’s ambit are 
necessary for the Baltic countries to overcome their biggest vulnerability to hybrid 
warfare: namely, the presence of large stateless populations in Estonia and Latvia. 
This essay first conceptualizes ‘hybrid warfare’ and proceeds to explain its appeal 
for the Kremlin in NATO’s eastern flank. The essay then induces the general conditions 
under which a belligerent might launch hybrid warfare before reviewing recent proposals 
for how NATO should deter Russia.  
The Concept and Utility of Hybrid Warfare 
Military strategists have long been aware of how belligerents could wage war against 
their adversaries in ways that do not involve set-piece battles or large coordinated 
military campaigns between opposing armies to score decisive victories. With the 
emergence of nationalism and class identities in the nineteenth century, military theorists 
like Carl von Clausewitz and political thinkers like Friedrich Engels and Vladimir Lenin 
contemplated the conditions under which insurgencies could prevail against central 
governments. T.E. Lawrence and Mao Ze-Dong also wrote on how best to mount military 
operations against stronger adversaries. A common thread in all these analyses is that 
direct military confrontations would only benefit the strong. Accordingly, more 
incremental, subtler, and indirect tactics are appropriate. These tactics include using 
 4 
propaganda to mobilize support for the insurgency and to demoralize enemy forces as 
well as attacking the weak points of opposing militaries.
4
  
 Contemporary military theorists have drawn on this intellectual tradition to 
speculate over the nature of war in an age marked less by interstate wars and more by 
civil wars. Presumably because nuclear weapons make direct military confrontation 
between them too risky and costly, major powers choose not to fight each other.
5
 When 
they do wage wars, as the United States did in Vietnam and Russia did in Chechnya, they 
fight weaker adversaries, usually to change regimes, mount counterinsurgencies, or 
launch proxy campaigns against peer competitors. Military theorists argue that 
contemporary wars between adversaries of vastly unequal capabilities now combine 
elements of regular conventional warfare with elements of irregular (guerilla) warfare. 
That is, in one military campaign, large formations might still be used for some missions, 
but other missions could require smaller, more mobile units that sometimes need to act 
covertly to inflict damage on the adversary. Russell Glenn thus defines a hybrid threat as:  
‘any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix 
of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activities in the 
operational battlespace. Rather than a single entity, a hybrid threat or 
challenger may be comprised of a combination of state and non-state 
actors.’6 
Similarly, although they argue that hybrid warfare has been a feature of 
international politics for millennia, Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor define 
hybrid warfare to be “a conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces 
and irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists), which could include both state and 
non-state actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose.”7 
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Yet the alleged hybrid warfare that Russia has used against Ukraine reveals the 
inadequacies of these definitions. Specifically, the focus on the combined use of regular 
and irregular warfare is at once too broad and too narrow. It is too broad because many 
wars in history have incorporated features of both regular and irregular warfare. As much 
as the Grand Coalition waged set-piece battles against Nazi Germany in the Second 
World War, its members also backed resistance groups fighting Nazi occupation, dropped 
propaganda leaflets, and supported acts of sabotage (e.g., Operation Gunnerside). Even 
the Second World War can be considered to have been a hybrid war. The focus is also too 
narrow because in these definitions both regular and irregular wars are used either 
simultaneously or sequentially in the theater of operations. However, the occupation of 
Crimea did not involve Russia deploying regular forces in Ukraine until the peninsula 
was already secured under its control. The annexation of Crimea was conspicuous in its 
lack of regular warfare. 
Mindful of these observations, I reconceptualize hybrid warfare as a strategy 
rather than a new form of war. It is a strategy because it deliberately integrates the use of 
various instruments of national power so as to achieve international objectives in light of 
the believed goals and capabilities of the adversary. It can cover a range of expedients so 
long as an overarching goal guides their purpose.
8
 As such, hybrid warfare involves the 
coordinated use of regular and irregular military means towards different but 
complementary ends. The use of irregular warfare is to expose and to exploit a target’s 
vulnerabilities at lower levels of violence than a direct military confrontation between 
militaries. Ironically, the purpose of regular warfare is to engage in it as minimally as 
possible. That is, the belligerent threatens to use higher gradations of military force so as 
to deter its target from retaliating strongly. Hybrid warfare thus requires that the 
belligerent possesses escalation dominance, meaning that it can engage and defeat its 
target at different levels of military escalation.
9
 Nevertheless, in waging hybrid warfare, 
the belligerent is actively striving to undermine its target’s territorial integrity, subvert its 
internal political cohesion, and disrupt its economy. Hybrid warfare can serve such 
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revisionist goals as territorial expansion and the imposition of indirect rule over another 
(nominally) sovereign state.  
The irregular military component of hybrid warfare can encompass different 
tactics of varying intensity, many of which have been used in insurgencies. On one end of 
the spectrum is propaganda, which is a communicative act that a belligerent undertakes 
in order to influence the attitudes held by members of the target’s society. Propaganda 
serves to hamper the target’s ability to draw on popular support in pursuing its policies 
and mobilizing its resources. Next is espionage whereby agents clandestinely gather 
intelligence in order to confer a coercive bargaining advantage for the belligerent. 
Alternatively, agents could spread deliberately false information among unsuspecting 
members of a public regarding the activities and intentions of particular organizations. 
More intensely, the belligerent can resort to agitation so as to create dissension and 
discord within a target society when none yet exists. The next tactic is criminal disorder 
whereby the belligerent’s agents engage in hit-and-run attacks, cyber attacks, sabotage, or 
kidnapping. The belligerent could also cultivate fifth columns, or groups of individuals, 
usually acting covertly, who are embedded within a much larger population that they seek 
to undermine. Fifth columns could agitate, but they might simply wait for hostilities to 
break out between the target and the belligerent before becoming active. Such fifth 
columns might facilitate the military campaign of the government they support at an 
opportune moment. Next, the belligerent could insert unmarked soldiers who are armed 
but lack the insignia that would identify them and their home government. Unmarked 
soldiers enable the belligerent to man checkpoints, occupy government buildings and 
other sites of strategic interest, seize prized military assets, and clear an area ahead of an 
overt military operation. Most intensely, but still short of a direct military confrontation, 
the belligerent might launch border skirmishes to unsettle the target, probe its weaknesses, 
and sap its resources. 
All these actions take place in the shadow of possible conventional war, and so it 
should be apparent that hybrid warfare is not a recent invention. Indeed, the Soviet Union 
employed these tactics immediately after the Second World War with Cominform, 
sponsoring communist movements in Europe and elsewhere to undermine capitalist 
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countries from within. Aggressors have used so-called ‘fifth columns’ to fulfill political 
objectives at the expense of their adversaries. One illustrative example of a ‘fifth column’ 
was the Sudeten-German Free Corps that was active in Czechoslovakia in the late 1930s. 
This paramilitary organization was ethnically German and had Nazi sympathies. It 
launched terrorist attacks to incite the Czechoslovak government into a military or 
political response that would precipitate Nazi actions to rescue co-ethnics and annex the 
Sudetenland into the Third Reich.
10
  
Hybrid warfare is not simply guerilla warfare waged by a strong state. Consider 
one definition of guerilla warfare that emphasizes four distinguishing attributes. First, 
guerrilla fighters are irregular forces “organized in small, highly mobile units and 
operating without heavy weaponry such as tanks, artillery, or aircraft.” Second, guerilla 
fighters prefer protracted warfare, use such tactics as hit-and-run attacks and terrorism, 
and avoid set-piece battles. Third, guerilla forces often operate in areas that their 
adversaries control, thereby waging warfare in a manner that obscures the lines of battle. 
Finally, guerrillas depend on local populations for support. Guerilla fighters even hide 
amongst members of the local population to prevent detection by their adversary.
11
 
Hybrid warfare can incorporate these features, but some aspects of guerrilla war do not 
have to be present. For example, hybrid warfare does not preclude the use of heavy 
weaponry. The belligerent can arm local groups with heavy weapons in order to erode the 
strength of the target while still avoiding a direct confrontation. Moreover, protracted 
warfare might be unacceptable. The belligerent could use a fifth column for destabilizing 
a contested environment, thereby positioning itself to move swiftly to grab a certain prize 
before the target can respond. 
This desire for avoiding a direct military confrontation can have different sources, 
some of which may become more salient in contemporary times. First, global norms 
against war, conquest, and territorial violations have strengthened since the Second 
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 States find it harder to justify unilateral seizures of territory held by other 
sovereign states. They prefer to legitimate or rationalize their uses of forces through 
international institutions like the United Nations Security Council.
13
 Accordingly, Russia 
annexed Crimea in a manner intended to make the take-over appear indigenously led. 
Second, more direct uses of force might elicit resistance from a militarily superior 
coalition of adversaries. If the target has powerful allies or friends, then hybrid warfare 
also helps avoid triggering an intervention that the belligerent does not believe it can 
handle. This observation implies that the belligerent has local escalation dominance but 
not global escalation dominance. By introducing an element of ‘plausible deniability’, the 
belligerent could forestall a widening of the conflict while still degrading the capabilities 
of its target. Third, domestic considerations might make hybrid warfare an attractive 
option to the belligerent. An overt military conflict could be unpopular, especially if it 
means imposing some hardship on the domestic public. Put together, hybrid warfare is 
appealing because it is not as costly as a direct military confrontation on the battlefield. It 
also skirts international norms and escapes harmful political consequences. 
Hybrid warfare thus features a paradox. By resorting to irregular warfare in order 
to realize political objectives, the belligerent appears to be averse to military escalation. 
However, the belligerent is using the threat of military escalation to unsettle and to deter 
a strong response by its target. How can this threat be credible if the very adoption of the 
hybrid strategy should undercut it? Several answers are possible. Because the belligerent 
has local escalation dominance, the target is self-deterred from escalating. It knows that it 
will be defeated in an actual military confrontation with that belligerent. Another 
possibility is that hybrid warfare gives the belligerent ‘plausible deniability’ and thus 
deters external intervention by confusing the potential opposition. The belligerent can 
disclaim responsibility for local agitators and rebel groups. Alternatively, it could claim 
that the actions of local agitators have popular support. In either case, the belligerent can 
exploit the resulting uncertainty so as to keep its adversaries off balance.   
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Of course, the benefits of hybrid warfare must be considered alongside the costs. 
Subterfuge generally requires patience and care. It does not yield immediate results: fifth 
columns need nurturing before they can become operational and propaganda might take 
time to resonate with the target population, if at all. Local enforcement agencies and 
intelligence communities can also undertake countermeasures against agitators, saboteurs, 
and enemy agents. Moreover, targets of hybrid warfare will not take the bait if they 
suspect that they are being goaded into a certain reaction. Agitation might even backfire 
if members of the target population rally around their government rather than show 
dissension. Finally, as in any war, miscalculation is likely. It might even be more 
common because the local agents serving the belligerent could have their own interests 
and become difficult to manage once they are armed.  
The Appeal of Hybrid Warfare in the Former Soviet Region 
The seeming paradox at the heart of hybrid warfare is also resolvable if we consider 
situational factors. Below I argue that particular conditions within the former Soviet 
Union might facilitate Russian subversion, forestall military escalation, deter external 
intervention, and, by extension, make hybrid warfare viable. At least four attributes of the 
region deserve mention: its ethnic heterogeneity, the presence of latent historical 
grievances, the weakness of local civil societies, and the resulting regional complexity 
that Russia is better positioned to grasp than external powers. Although Russia has 
escalation dominance over Ukraine, this asymmetry alone does not account for the 
substance of the Russian hybrid warfare we have so far observed. Nor does it fully reveal 
the ways in which other countries of the former Soviet Union might be vulnerable. 
Finally, the foregoing attributes of the region would not matter if Russia had no interest 
to mount hybrid warfare. I discuss briefly the political and doctrinal drivers of this 
interest before inducing several general propositions regarding where we should observe 
hybrid warfare. 
 Because the following discussion addresses issues regarding ethnicity and 
nationalism, several definitions are necessary. An ethnic group has a group name, a sense 
of common descent, shared historical memories, shared cultural attributes like language 
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and religion, and some degree of territorial attachment.
14
 A nation is a ‘socially mobilized 
body of individuals … striving to create or maintain their own state.’15 Nationalism is the 
ideology underpinning this effort. Ethnic groups can engage in nationalism if they value 
independent statehood. 
Ethnic Heterogeneity 
The Soviet Union was one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world. Ethnic 
Russians barely formed a majority of its total population. Its collapse in 1990–1991 
meant that some ethnic groups declared that the Soviet republic they dominated as their 
own newly independent country.
16
 Conversely, many ethnic Russians and Russian-
speaking peoples found themselves in new countries governed by an elite who did not 
speak their language or share their ethnicity. For example, Estonia and Latvia feature 
populations that are about a quarter Russian. In Estonia and Latvia, about seven percent 
and twelve percent of their populations, respectively, are stateless, the majority of which 
are ethnically Russian. They lack political rights and are more likely to experience 
unemployment.
17
 Other countries might have much smaller Russian populations but they 
still contain diverse populations. Ethnic groups in these countries sometimes clamor for 
greater autonomy.  Abkhazians and South Ossetians in Georgia are two examples. Ethnic 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis still contest the region of Nagorno-Karabakh.  
 Ethnic heterogeneity in the former Soviet region alone does not mean conflict, but 
it does offer opportunities for the Kremlin to foment local discord to its advantage. First, 
Moscow can assist the efforts of aspiring secessionist groups at the expense of those 
countries that pursue foreign policies Russia sees as inimical to its own interests. These 
secessionist groups do not necessarily have to be Russian or speak Russian to be of value 
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to the Kremlin. What matters is whether they can challenge or fight governments that the 
Kremlin dislikes. Second, as the Kremlin has done already with regards to Ukraine, it can 
assert itself as a guarantor for the political rights of self-identifying Russians or Russian-
speaking peoples. Whether those groups see such protection as desirable is immaterial. 
Russia can still intervene in domestic policy debates of its neighbors when language and 
other cultural rights are debated. The Kremlin might even find individuals within those 
Russian minority populations to do its bidding. Such a situation is dangerous. If 
governments start seeing certain minority populations as potential fifth columns, then 
they could take repressive measures. Not only would such a response entail the unfair and 
harmful treatment of minority populations, but it would also prompt the Kremlin to act 
upon its self-proclaimed status as the defender of Russian rights.  
Latent Historic Grievances 
Ethnic politics have salience in this region because it involves myths and symbols that 
continue to resonate. Symbols are emotionally charged referents to beliefs that supply 
meaning to events or actions for a particular group of people. Ethnic groups value 
symbols that evoke kinship feelings as well as a shared sense of history. Sometimes these 
symbols justify chauvinism or hostility towards another group. When members of an 
ethnic group fear that their rights and welfare are threatened, the symbols that orient their 
worldly outlook can shape their response. Those groups with a history of having 
experienced victimization, domination, and other collective traumas might react more 
forcefully than others to safeguard their interests. Accordingly, ethnic conflict does not 
have to be the result of cynical elites seeking to keep their political offices. Mass-led 
movements could instead emerge, thereby compelling elites to make ethnic appeals in 
order to retain support.
18
 
 As elsewhere in Europe, nationalist and ethnic identities in Eastern Europe were 
the product of social processes that began in the nineteenth century. However, elite 
reactions to imperial domination influenced the formation of these identities. Lithuanian 
nationalism developed in response to perceptions of Polish cultural hegemony among 
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literary elites. Ukrainian nationalism was partly borne out of a shared sense of 
subjugation to Polish, Russian, and even Soviet control.
19
 Several other nationalisms 
coalesced in light of how ethnic groups (e.g., the Georgians) experienced imperial 
Russian, and later Soviet, colonization.   
 A history of experiencing domination can already create an acute sensitivity to 
external threats. Compounding this problem in the former Soviet region is how traumatic 
events impinged upon the historical development of these nationalisms over the course of 
the twentieth century. For an illustration, consider the history of Polish-Ukrainian 
relations. In the interwar period, ethnic Ukrainians living in eastern Poland saw Polish 
rule as discriminatory and repressive. So much so that some used the Soviet invasion in 
1939 as an occasion to launch reprisals against local Poles. The bloodshed that ensued 
created spiral dynamics whereby members of both ethnic groups would escalate conflict 
by targeting each other with increasingly brutal violence.
20
A campaign by the 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) to cleanse the region of Volhynia 
ethnically led to the killing of about 100,000 Poles. In the internecine conflict that 
continued even after 1945 in what is today western Ukraine, Poles committed their own 
atrocities against Ukrainian populations, particularly during a campaign of forcible 
resettlement called Operation Vistula. Both sides thus have their own grievances and a 
sense of being wronged. The history of Lithuanian-Polish relations features similar moral 




These events unfolded against the backdrop of a larger struggle between Nazi 
German and Soviet forces. This conflict had visited its own terrors upon the many 
civilians caught in the middle. The Soviet Union ultimately prevailed against Nazi 
Germany, with the benefit of being positioned to rule over a large share of Central-
Eastern Europe in the post-war period. Establishing this rule was oftentimes violent. The 
three Baltic countries once again lost their independence and were absorbed into the 
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Soviet Union. If they had survived the war, elites from the interwar period fled from their 
home countries, withdrew from political life, or suffered some fate at the hands of Soviet 
police. The communist parties that installed themselves in power in the region regarded 
stakeholders in the interwar regimes and anti-communist opponents alike as 
counterrevolutionary enemies and treated them accordingly. Over time these communist 
regimes consolidated power, even gaining the acquiescence of the populations over 
which they ruled despite the occasional revolt and reformist movement.  
These traumatic experiences provide a repository of historical grievances and 
emotionally charged symbols that the Kremlin can use to divide and conquer target 
societies and to prevent strong alliance ties from developing between them. It is not 
accidental that it denounced Euromaidan and the post-Yanukovych regime in early 2014 
as being steeped in the historical influence of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the OUN. 
After all, under his leadership, the OUN briefly sided with Nazi Germany in 1941 to 
subvert Soviet influence in Ukraine. Even after the annexation of Crimea, the Kremlin 
appealed to the linguistic and ethnic identities of populations in eastern Ukraine so as to 
present itself as a legitimate guarantor of their security. The Kremlin arguably hoped to 
inspire an indigenous movement that would agitate for unification with Russia, provoke 
Kiev into a violent response, and invite a Russian intervention to rescue it.
22
  
Such manipulation of symbols has become common. Elsewhere in the region, 
Facebook groups have appeared demanding the deployment of ‘little green men’ to 
support greater independence on behalf of Russian and Polish speaking populations 
living in Lithuania.
23
 Polish and Lithuanian government officials quickly denounced 
these efforts as provocations. Another cynical manipulation of symbolic politics involved 
President Vladimir Putin’s defense of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This treaty between 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union contained guarantees of non-aggression as well as 
secret provisions outlining the annexation and partition of countries in Eastern Europe. In 
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defending this treaty, Putin referred to Poland’s annexation of disputed territories in 
Czechoslovakia to argue that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was typical of its time. Yet 
these abortive efforts to create discord are a reminder of how nationalist controversies 
could be stirred in a manner that disrupts the internal cohesion of NATO members and 
the diplomatic relations between them.  
Weak Civil Societies 
Because of the historical legacies with which they reckon, many former Soviet states 
have weak civil societies.
24
 Of course, groups of people participate in voluntary 
associations independent of government and business, but social networks in the region 
have not acquired the same density found in Western Europe.
25
 The weakness of civil 
society in the region has several implications for local political order. First, norms 
conducive to liberal democracy and civic values remain under-developed. These norms 
include those that promote community participation and inter-group cooperation. Second, 
as Francis Fukuyuma writes, ‘civil society serves to balance the state and to protect 
individuals from the state’s power.’26 Consequently, authoritarianism remains a persistent 
feature of the post-Soviet space. Alexander Lukashenko’s autocracy in Belarus endures 
partly because national identity is weak and voluntary associations have historically been 
repressed. Lukashenko has sought to extend his rule by actively discouraging the 
formation of Belarusian national identity and keeping tight control over associational life 
in Belarus. Even where elections are contested, as in Ukraine, elite infighting dominates 
national politics, resulting in governments with democratic and authoritarian features.
27
 
Still, robust liberal democracies like the Baltic countries have the strongest civil societies 
                                                        
24
 On the origins of authoritarianism in some post-communist states, see Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-
Busse, ‘The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Communist Collapse,’ World Politics 59:1 
(2006): pp. 83-115; Valerie Bunce, ‘The National Idea: Imperial Legacies and Post-Communist Pathways 
in Eastern Europe,’ East European Politics and Societies 19:3 (2005): pp. 406-442; and Grigore Pop-
Eleches, ‘Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change’, Journal of Politics 69:4 (2007): pp. 
908-926. 
25
 Roger Sapsford and Pamela Abbott, ‘Trust, Confidence, and Social Environment in Post-Communist 
Societies’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39:1 (2006): pp. 59-71. 
26
 Francis Fukuyuma ‘Social Capital, Civil Society and Development,’ Third World Quarterly 22:1 (2001): 
p. 11.  
27
 On the elite nature of Ukrainian politics, see Neil Robinson, ‘Economic and Political Hybridity: 
Patrimonial Capitalism in the post-Soviet Space,’ Journal of Eurasian Studies 4:2 (2013): pp. 143-144; and 
Taras Kuzio, ‘Twenty Years as an Independent State: Ukraine’s Ten Logical Inconsistencies,’ Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies 45:3-4 (2012): pp. 429-438. 
 15 
in the former Soviet space.
28
 Nevertheless, Estonia and Latvia feature large numbers of 
stateless persons who are not yet integrated in local political institutions and the domestic 
economy.  
 Civil society matters because it provides a buffer against social cleavages being 
exploited by hybrid warfare. After all, hybrid warfare involves manipulating existing 
cleavages to sow internal dissension and foment local discord. A strong civil society is 
one where different groups overcome the cleavages that may divide them so as to 
cooperate with another in the interests of larger political stability. It immunizes against 
some forms of hybrid warfare. By contrast, a weak civil society and the accompanying 
weakness of civic values will not inspire confidence among citizens in the governing 
institutions of the state. A belligerent can exploit this situation by finding recruits and 
opportunities to pursue its political objectives to the detriment of the target government.  
Regional Complexity 
The former Soviet region is complex because it features diverse ethnic groups that may 
have their own latent historical grievances against each other. These tensions are likely to 
persist if local civil societies remain weak. Outsiders are thus prone to misunderstanding 
regional politics. They might attribute ethnic conflict to situations where none exists; 
underestimate the power of symbols that particular groups cherish; overlook cleavages 
that could affect local political allegiances; and mistake the goals and preferences of local 
populations and their leaders. Accordingly, because it is relatively more familiar with its 
own region, the Kremlin has a tactical advantage over other major powers. It can exploit 
western uncertainties and misperceptions by justifying its actions as having indigenous 
support. Other states (or at least members of their publics) that could otherwise mobilize 
a response to Russian hybrid warfare might too easily accept the Kremlin’s interpretation 
of regional events. Using its media outlets, the Kremlin can disseminate its own 
perspective widely, thereby framing local political developments on favorable terms.  
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 This tactical advantage was apparent in the early stages of the crisis between 
Russia and Ukraine in early 2014. Beforehand, a common interpretation of Ukrainian 
politics in the western media was that Ukrainian politics featured two coalitions, one pro-
Western (or pro-European) and another pro-Russian. These coalitions formed on 
linguistic cleavages between Ukrainian speakers located in western Ukraine and Russian 
speakers in eastern Ukraine. Samuel Huntington once called attention to these 
demographic factors to argue that Ukraine represented a ‘fractured state’ – the allegiance 
of which would always be torn between the west and Russia so long as it continues to 
exist in its post-Soviet form.
29
 Yet this view oversimplifies pre-2014 Ukrainian politics.  
The western city of Odessa is a pocket of a Russian-speaking population whose 
relationship and identification with Russia is at best ambiguous. The Crimean status 
referendum in March 2014 is another case in point. The reported poll results suggested 
that voters overwhelmingly favored joining Russia as a federal subject. Reports of 
coercion and fraud cast doubt on these results. Nevertheless, studies predating the 
Ukrainian crisis show that survey respondents in Crimea were mostly in favor of Crimea 
gaining at least more autonomy vis-à-vis Ukraine, if not integration with Russia. Yet pro-




Notwithstanding this complexity, the western narrative of the Ukrainian political 
crisis in early 2014 relied on standard tropes of an east-west national division. The 
implication of such characterizations of Ukraine is that Russian claims of indigenous 
support might have some validity, if not legitimacy. The result is that international efforts 
to challenge Russian efforts became difficult to mount on liberal principles, especially if 
the majority of a region’s population had expressed support for Russian integration in the 
past. Moreover, uncertainty deepens among outsider states as to the true nature of the 
political interests of local actors and how they ought to be accommodated in a political 
solution that differs from Russian proposals. Russia’s strategy had this goal in mind since 
its leaders adopted such legal rhetoric to deter a western response. As Roy Allison wrote, 
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its legal rhetoric ‘aimed to blur the legal and illegal, to create justificatory smokescreens, 
in part by exploiting some areas of uncertainty in international law, while making 
unfounded assertions of ‘facts’ (especially ostensible threats to Russians and Russian-
speakers).’31 And so despite condemning the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent 
local referendum, NATO leaders had few ideas for reversing this outcome.   
Why Russia Might Use Hybrid Warfare 
Whether the Baltic states or other former Soviet republics are vulnerable to hybrid 
warfare is only if Russia has an interest to expand or reassert its regional hegemony. 
After all, Putin famously stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest 
tragedy of the twentieth century. Moreover, Putin and other Russian leaders might see 
their political survival as linked to the fate of those neighboring regimes that share similar 
political values. The Kremlin might regard the success of opposition movements in 
nearby countries as unsettling because they fear “the transnational spread of 
revolution.”32 Regardless, the interest driving hybrid war is not oriented on defending the 
international status quo since it can involve territorial expansion and violating the 
sovereignty of other countries. 
Contemporary Russian military doctrine emphasizes the need to respond to both 
external and internal threats. This doctrinal perspective has a historical basis because the 
Kremlin has feared not only other great powers, but also subversive organizations 
operating within areas of its control. Against external threats, under the influence of 
Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky’s military thought, Soviet war-planning centered on 
using combined arms to strike deep into the enemy’s rear, thereby exploiting firepower 
and mobility to go on the offensive.
33
 These plans went unchanged even when the Soviet 
Union incorporated nuclear weapons into its arsenal. Against threats emanating within its 
sphere of influence, the Soviet military played more of a domestic political role within 
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satellite countries, intimidating potential opponents by its mere presence.
34
 In 
Czechoslovakia, where the Soviet Union did not have a troop presence before 1968, 
Warsaw Pact forces invaded in order to quash the Prague Spring. Similarly, the Soviet 
Union deployed its military in Afghanistan to prop up a communist regime.  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited most of its military 
assets. Due to its weakened international position and fragmented domestic politics, 
countering internal threats preoccupied the attention of the Russian Armed Forces in the 
post-Cold War period. It fought two brutal counterinsurgencies in the republic of 
Chechnya that employed indiscriminate warfare extensively between 1994 and 2009. 
However, partly thanks to increased revenues from its indigenous energy sources, Russia 
restored its economy, modernized its military, and became more assertive in the former 
Soviet space. In 2008, the Kremlin fought a war against Georgia, ostensibly to protect 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgian military aggression. Russia resorted to 
traditional military means in persecuting its war against Georgia in 2008. This conflict 
involved set-piece battles and large-scale conventional military operations. Though 
Russia eventually prevailed, several logistical challenges and poor tactical performance 
bedeviled its conduct of the war.
35
  Moscow evidently learned from its mistakes so as not 
to show the same clumsiness in its use of force against Ukraine in 2014.  
The conductivity of the region to hybrid warfare was not apparent to the Kremlin 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Still, some Russian military theoreticians and leaders 
have speculated on the future of war. They have been aware since the 1970s that the 
United States was gaining an edge in information, precision strike, and communications 
technologies. One prominent Russian military theoretician declared in 1995 that countries 
could “become objects of information warfare.” He speculated that the opening stages of 
a war would feature disinformation campaigns whereby belligerents would seek to 
undermine local trust in the governments they target.
36
 Sergei Chekinov and Sergei 
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Bogdanov describe ‘new-generation war’ whereby “the role of mobile joint forces 
operating in an integrated reconnaissance and information environment is rising.”37 In 
their view, information superiority has become a necessity in contemporary warfare. 
Though they have the United States in mind as an adversary that will exploit such 
advantages, they write that “with powerful information technologies at its disposal, the 
aggressor will make an effort to involve all public institutions in the country it intends to 
attack.”38 Subversive missions would thus precede any conventional military campaign.39  
Other Russian military leaders have drawn similar conclusions. The Chief of the General 
Staff of the Russian Armed Forces hypothesized that in future conflicts the use of force 
would be disguised and the information space exploited so as to undermine the target’s 
ability to retaliate. Even Presidential advisor Vladislav Surkov, writing under a 
pseudonym, claimed shortly after the annexation of Crimea that contemporary war would 
be total yet discrete in its conduct. Thus, by the time Russia launched hybrid warfare 
against Ukraine, its military leaders and strategists came to the view that war would 
increasingly use subversion in the information space to achieve coercive effects.
40
  
Putting It Together: A Theory of Hybrid Warfare 
Several features of the former Soviet political landscape make hybrid warfare a tempting 
strategy for Russian leaders. The diversity of the groups that inhabit the region, some 
with at least latent historical grievances against others, make the area ripe for tension. 
Russia has a tactical advantage by virtue of being in it. Russia has historical familiarity 
with the conflicts, latent or actual, that abound in the region. It is positioned to frame 
local events and conflicts in a manner favorable to its interests, thereby forestalling an 
unfavorable response from outside actors. Yet these factors would be irrelevant if Russia 
did not have escalation dominance over its neighbors and an interest to expand its zone of 
influence and revise the status quo. 
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To be sure, hybrid warfare has not been equally effective across all parts of the 
former Soviet space. Russia has found some areas of Ukraine more amenable to its 
waging of hybrid warfare than others. This observation is unsurprising sine war turns on 
unforeseeable and sometimes random developments. In annexing Crimea, Russia was 
able to avail itself of the large military presence it already had there. Indeed, the presence 
of many retired servicemen in Crimea’s major cities was useful for rallying indigenous 
support. By contrast, eastern Ukraine has proven harder for the Kremlin in terms of 
mobilizing the local population against Kiev. Russia remains prone to miscalculation 
despite its relative familiarity with the region. Yet the larger point stands: that, at least 
during the beginning of the crisis, Russia was able to claim greater knowledge of regional 
politics and to frame local events favorably. That is, Russia’s advantage in local 
knowledge and access over NATO was relative and not absolute. When other 
governments finally started appreciating the complexity of Ukrainian politics, Russia had 
already taken control of Crimea and began arming rebels in eastern Ukraine.  
 This discussion thus reveals four conditions in which a belligerent would use 
hybrid warfare. First, the belligerent has local escalation dominance but not necessarily 
global escalation dominance. Because the belligerent has greater military power, it can 
threaten to unleash greater violence in order to deter a particular military response from 
its target. Not having global escalation dominance means that the belligerent wishes to 
contain the conflict locally and deter external intervention. Second, the belligerent wishes 
to expand its sphere of influence and to revise the status quo by changing borders and 
influencing the political regimes of neighboring states. Hybrid warfare is not a defensive 
strategy that status quo states use. Third, the target state is weak specifically because it 
lacks a strong civil society that mends ethnic and linguistic cleavages. The belligerent can 
manipulate local grievances and animosities to weaken the target from within. Finally, 
ethnic or linguistic groups in the neighbor have some ties with the belligerent. These ties 
confer an informational advantage on the belligerent since it can better understand the 
nature of local rival and grievances. Moreover, these ties might even lend the efforts of 
the belligerent some legitimacy in its framing of the conflict.  
Implications for NATO in the Former Soviet Region  
 21 
If the region is conducive to Russian hybrid warfare, then how can the United States and 
NATO best contribute to the defense and deterrence against such forms of aggression? 
How should they use military power to protect members like the Baltic countries from 
hybrid warfare? What are the limits in providing extended deterrence on their behalf? 
 The Baltic states already benefit from NATO membership in many ways. They 
can call other allies to a joint session for consultations if they feel threatened, as Poland 
and Lithuania did in April 2014 by invoking Article Four of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Moreover, Article Five of this treaty asserts that an attack against one ally is an attack 
against all. Beyond the provisions of the treaty itself, NATO has in aggregate 
conventional and nuclear supremacy over Russia. The defense pact also facilitates joint 
military exercises that enhance the war-fighting capabilities of its members. Still, Russian 
actions against Ukraine have prompted observers to debate whether NATO poses as 
effective of a deterrent as possible against Russia. Many of the solutions that strategists 
have described as being useful for countering Russian aggression rely largely on making 
adjustments to the military infrastructure that NATO already has in place in Europe. The 
problem is that Russia pursues its hybrid warfare to lower the risk of triggering the use of 
NATO’s capabilities more appropriate for conventional or even nuclear war.  
Consider a sophisticated and comprehensive discussion by Matthew Kroenig of 
how NATO should adapt its military posture to the current security environment in the 
former Soviet Union. After all, the military presence of both the United States and NATO 
is limited in the Baltic countries. American forward deployed troops and tactical nuclear 
weapons are located primarily in Western Europe.
42
 His proposals include extending and 
expanding NATO’s temporary deployments to the Baltics; having a forward presence in 
Eastern Europe despite the injunctions against so doing in the NATO-Russia Founding 
Act; assisting Eastern European members with the modernization and standardization of 
their military forces; and developing and deploying a new generation of sub-strategic 
nuclear weapons to Europe to respond to potential Russian nuclear aggression at the 
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 Kroenig does address strengthening NATO capabilities at levels of 
violence lower than conventional and nuclear war. He writes that NATO ought to: 
‘…  strengthen Eastern European states, including military assistance with 
intelligence and early-warning capabilities, cyber security, airpower, and 
stepped-up training in policing, border patrol and counter-insurgency. 
Although outside of NATO’s normal lane, vulnerable member states 
should also be encouraged to pursue a political agenda to incorporate 
ethnic minorities into a shared national-identity conception. In case all 
else fails, Eastern European allies must make themselves indigestible to a 
Russian occupation.’44 
This brief passage aside, much of his attention centers on deterring Russia at 
much higher levels of violence.  
The primacy accorded here to military means is understandable given that NATO 
is a military alliance. Indeed, many of the measures adopted by NATO so far have this 
flavor. At the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO members agreed to Readiness 
Action Plan. Some of the measures have included increasing the number of fighter jets on 
air-policing patrols four-fold and starting surveillance flights over the Baltics. NATO 
members also pledged to send more ships on patrol in its eastern flank as well as to 
deploy ground forces to Eastern Europe for training and exercises on a rotational basis.
45
 
NATO also organized the new Spearhead Force – a “land brigade of around 5000 troops” 
– with the goal of bolstering its high readiness capabilities.46 In summer 2015, the United 
States even decided to pre-position heavy weaponry in Eastern Europe. NATO military 
exercises have also become more frequent, including Trident Juncture in autumn 2015 –
the largest military exercise it has undertaken in thirteen years.  
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However, my discussion regarding the applicability of hybrid warfare in the 
former Soviet region reveals some of the shortcomings associated with a predominantly 
military solution. To begin with, too much emphasis on deterring aggression at higher 
levels of violence might undercut deterrence at lower levels of violence. Such is the 
stability-instability paradox that Glenn Snyder describes. Under mutual assured 
destruction between two nuclear-armed adversaries, direct and major war becomes very 
unlikely since both sides seek to avoid annihilation. Consequently, both sides might 
perversely find it safe to engage in conflicts that do not involve nuclear weapons.
47
 
Therefore, bolstering alliance capabilities at higher levels of violence could make hybrid 
warfare even more attractive. After all, hybrid warfare exploits the vulnerability of targets 
at even lower levels of violence whereby the belligerent can plausibly deny that it is even 
engaging in aggression. The belligerent could thus deter its target from undertaking 
escalatory measures. It also denies the adversaries a clear, compelling rationale for 
military intervention by obfuscating the nature of local crises fomented from without. 
Such is the concern that the Baltic countries have with respect to NATO. 
Although NATO has escalation dominance over Russia, Russia has escalation dominance 
over the Baltic countries individually and collectively. Yet their level of susceptibility 
to Russian hybrid warfare varies between them.  Lithuania does not have a stateless 
Russian-speaking population. Though it is more homogenous of the three, Lithuania 
granted citizenship to all residents shortly after independence regardless of their 
ethnicity.  Elsewhere in the region, the Estonian Centre Party is popular among 
ethnic Russians and has even courted United Russia, which is associated with 
Putin.48 The Latvian Union of Russians tried unsuccessfully to amend the country’s 
language laws in 2011 and has supported Russian moves in Crimea.49 More urgently, 
Estonia and Latvia have large stateless populations that are largely Russian. As such, 
Russia could opportunistically incite ethnic tensions. Such actions could destabilize 
                                                        
47
 Glenn Snyder, ‘The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror’, in Paul Seabury, ed., The Balance of 
Power (San Francisco: Chandler Books, 1965).  
48
 “Party with ties to Putin ahead in Estonian polls,” Financial Times (27, February, 2015). Online: 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1decfbac-be8a-11e4-a341-00144feab7de.html#axzz3o6fvyRcV, 9 October, 
2015.  
49
 “Pro-Russia Party Signs Major Deal with Crimea Group,” Baltic Times (13 August, 2014).  Online: 
http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/35355/#.VA97mRbgJHU, 9 October, 2015. 
 24 
those societies and forestall an unfavorable NATO reaction if its members cannot agree 
that Russia bears responsibility, especially if some semblance of local initiative exists. It 
might not be entirely clear whether and how much Russia instigated it. 
And so the Baltic countries remain exposed to more subversive Russian tactics 
that are ambiguous enough not to prompt such escalatory measures like an Article Five 
invocation. Indeed, Article Five is most appropriate for scenarios that involve overt and 
unambiguous forms of military attack against a NATO member. More subtle forms of 
attack that give the belligerent ‘plausible deniability’ – such as those involving local 
ethnic tensions – might not even trigger Article Five considerations. Alternatively, 
though invoking Article Five does not automatically mean a military response, it might 
still be a disproportionate answer to hybrid warfare since it has only occurred once in the 
history of NATO (after the September 11 attacks).  
The Baltic countries benefit from NATO enhancing its aggregate military 
capabilities, but they remain vulnerable if their western counterparts are unwilling to 
defend them. Indeed, NATO’s deterrent threat depends just as much on the willingness of 
the entire alliance as it does on its capabilities – something which predominantly military 
solutions overlook. Russian hybrid warfare seeks to dampen such willingness because 
situational factors unique to the Baltic countries might confound efforts to attribute a 
seeming act of aggression to Russia. The Baltic countries accordingly have an incentive 
to improve their counterintelligence capabilities, among themselves and other NATO 
allies. Yet even this solution needs to be coupled with a concerted effort to integrate those 
stateless populations politically and economically so that they do not develop grievances 
regarding their status. Alliance members would do better by strengthening local civil 
societies and their law enforcement capabilities. Strong civil societies inoculate states 
from belligerents attempting to undermine them from within. Strong law enforcement 
capabilities can improve the detection and arrest of agents and provocateurs. 
 Another reason exists for why western NATO allies might be reluctant to defend 
the Baltic countries. Already some NATO members have trouble abiding fully by their 
stated alliance commitments. Members like Spain and Italy that do not feel threatened by 
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Russian actions are likely to keep defense expenditures low.
51
 Those countries are also 
less likely to back strong sanctions against Russia. Moreover, the Kremlin has actively 
courted populist political parties in Europe regardless of their political orientation. The 
most prominent examples are Le Front National (France), Jobbik (Hungary), the United 
Kingdom Independence Party, Podemos (Spain), and Syriza (Greece). These parties have 
recently made electoral gains in their home countries because they capture the 
disaffection of voters who feel the strain of persistent economic crisis or are disillusioned 
with more mainstream political parties. Out of their affinity with the Kremlin, these 
parties have endorsed the Crimean referendum and separatist-organized elections in 
eastern Ukraine, criticized efforts to sanction Russia, and express an admiration for 
Vladimir Putin and his brand of social conservatism.
52
 If they become more popular, then 
NATO might be hamstrung in its efforts to show unity, counter Russian narratives, and 
sanction Russian efforts. Already surveys have shown domestic publics in some 




This observation suggests that a reliance on military solutions obscures the 
underlying political dimension of the conflict. It is no coincidence that Russia has used 
nationalism both to legitimate its efforts and to engage in hybrid war when political 
parties friendly to Russia in Western Europe have populist or nationalist platforms. 
Russian pledges to support the initiative of local co-ethnics align well with the 
ideological agendas of Western European nationalist parties.
54
 European nationalists in 
these societies have little to no experience of Soviet or Russian domination so as to feel 
threatened by Russian policies. Accordingly, unlike in the former Soviet region, no anti-
Russian element abounds in Western European nationalisms. This political situation 
enables Russian hybrid warfare if NATO has difficulty crafting a unified and coherent 
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policy to check Russian aggression. Consequently, Russia is able to deter a stronger 
response from an international coalition while fighting to obtain its goals in Ukraine. 
Hybrid warfare is something that a military alliance like NATO alone might not be able 
to deter. It could provide an institutional framework to augment jointly the 
counterintelligence and law enforcement capabilities of the Baltic states. However, 
integrating stateless populations in the region is a political challenge that demands a 
political solution rather than a military one. 
The larger problem of nationalist politics points to how NATO members should 
respond to Russian disinformation campaigns. Already the Netherlands and Poland have 
launched a Russian-language news agency intended to dispel Russian claims.
55
 Yet the 
receptivity of some Western European political parties to Moscow suggest that such 
campaigns should also be directed to European audience. These campaigns would require 
NATO members in Western Europe and North America to cultivate regional expertise in 




Hybrid warfare brings together significant conventional military power and tactics 
normally associated with guerilla operations. The belligerent uses hybrid warfare to 
obtain its political objectives at the expense of its target by keeping the conflict local. 
Russia’s use of hybrid warfare reflects to some degree its position of strength and local 
advantages. Accordingly, international security analysts are incorrect to argue that Russia 
has resorted to hybrid warfare because it is an ‘option of weakness.’57 Indeed, the strategy 
of hybrid warfare has applicability in the former Soviet region because Russia can 
leverage its escalation dominance over its neighbors and its relatively better local 
knowledge.  
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Of course, hybrid warfare has its drawbacks. Its subtlety requires patience and, as 
with any strategy in war, miscalculations could hamper its effectiveness. Agitators and 
ethnic allies become difficult to control once they receive weapons. Russia might have 
learned this lesson when rebels inadvertently shot down Malaysian Airlines Flight 17, 
prompting the United States and the European Union to impose stronger sanctions. Just 
because a region is susceptible to hybrid warfare does not mean that hybrid warfare will 
succeed.
58
 Nevertheless, the military solutions that some observers advocate are at best 
incomplete. NATO members must display political unity and resolve as much as they 
need to be capable. Vulnerable countries, like Estonia and Latvia especially, require 
strong civil societies and law enforcement capabilities whereas NATO must counter 
Russian propaganda efforts, even among its own domestic publics. 
 In outlining why the former Soviet Union is conducive to hybrid warfare, I 
inductively postulate the conditions under which a belligerent could engage in it. First, 
the belligerent has local escalation dominance but not global escalation dominance. It can 
deter escalation by the target but its military capabilities are insufficient against an 
international coalition or a global power. Second, the belligerent seeks to revise the status 
quo. Third, the belligerent’s target is weak insofar as its society features exploitable 
cleavages. Fourth, the neighbor has some ethnic or linguistic ties to the belligerent. Such 
ties offer opportunities to sow local discord. They also confer an informational advantage 
at the expense of outside actors whose intervention is feared.  
 For policy-makers, these propositions suggest that only under narrow 
circumstances would belligerents resort to hybrid warfare. It is not necessarily the future 
of warfare, but many of the conditions described above obtain in the former Soviet Union. 
In Moldova, the government currently faces allegations of graft after 1.5 billion 
American dollars disappeared from the country’s three largest banks just weeks before 
national parliamentary elections. Opposition groups have held large protests, demanding 
                                                        
58
 On how Russia has experienced challenges in its military and political operations against Ukraine, see 




 Indeed, throughout its post-Soviet existence, Moldova has 
experienced political instability, armed conflict with the partially recognized state of 
Transnistria, and tensions between the majority Romanian-speaking population and the 
minority Russian-speaking population. Thus, Moldova is vulnerable to Russian hybrid 
warfare. In other conflict-prone regions like East Asia, however, hybrid war should be 
less prevalent. China might already have escalation dominance over Vietnam and Taiwan, 
but only against Taiwan could it potentially use tactics to divide and agitate the 
population because of linguistic and ethnic ties. Still, China would find it very difficult to 
smuggle weapons and supplies to local agitators over the Taiwan Straits. For these 
reasons, too, China cannot use hybrid warfare against Japan or South Korea.  
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